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Blanaid Clarke* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article offers an Irish perspective on the market for corporate 
control (MCC), which plays a fundamental role in corporate governance 
theory. The MCC was first proposed by Henry Manne in a short article in 
the Journal of Political Economy in 1965.1 He argued that inefficient 
management2 in listed companies is reflected in decreases in share prices 
as discontented shareholders sell their shares rather than replace man-
agement.3 An opportunity thus arises for third parties to acquire these 
companies cheaply, replace the inefficient managers, and turn the com-
panies around. As a result, “the lower the stock price, relative to what it 
could be with more efficient management, the more attractive the take-
over becomes to those who believe that they can manage the company 
more efficiently.”4 The emphasis of the article—entitled Mergers and the 
Market for Corporate Control—was on the antitrust implications of the 
MCC.5 But Manne noted that “the analysis . . . has important implica-
tions for a variety of economic questions[,]” particularly those relating to 
the separation of ownership and control in large corporations.6 Manne 
argued that while one motivation for a merger might be the diminution of 
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 1. See Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 
(1965). 
 2. Manne never completely dealt with the question of what constitutes “efficient management” 
in the article, although he did note, when considering the benefits of the MCC and its contribution to 
efficiency, that “apart from the stock market, we have no objective standard of managerial efficien-
cy.” Id. at 113. 
 3. Id. at 112. 
 4. Id. at 113. 
 5. See George J. Stigler, Mergers and Preventive Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 176 
(1955). Manne refers to this article, which examines mergers through a competition lens emphasiz-
ing the economic cost of decreased competition. 
 6. Manne, supra note 1, at 112. 
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competition—a goal that involves social costs—a more likely motivation 
is the desire to improve corporate management.7 Manne thus claimed that 
“the potential return from the successful takeover and revitalization of a 
poorly run company can be enormous.”8 
A consequence of this potential value, Manne explained, is that the 
MCC acts as an important constraint on management behavior in circum-
stances where the owners, as Berle and Means suggested,9 lack apprecia-
ble control. He claimed that “only the take-over scheme provides some 
assurance of competitive efficiency among corporate managers and 
thereby affords strong protection to the interests of vast numbers of 
small, non-controlling shareholders.”10 It also affords shareholders 
“strong power,”11 which, it has been noted, stands in marked contrast to 
the prevailing characterization, at the time Manne was writing, of share-
holders as “chumps . . . routinely, and so predictably, bamboozled by 
managers supposedly advancing shareholder welfare but really maximis-
ing their own welfare.”12 Although Manne referred in the article to the 
replacement of inefficient managers, it is also clear that the MCC may 
exert a disciplinary effect by encouraging managers to improve their per-
formance in order to avoid a takeover and the subsequent loss of em-
ployment. 
Like much of Manne’s work, Mergers and the Market for Corpo-
rate Control has been described quite correctly as “ground-breaking,”13 
“revolutionary,”14 and “pioneering.”15 Roberta Romano argued that the 
article marked “the intellectual origin of what would become the new 
paradigm for corporate law.”16 She noted how Manne’s contribution 
achieved recognition following advances in modern finance,17 new re-
search methodologies,18 the economic theories of the firm,19 and the ad-
                                                 
 7. Id. at 113. 
 8. Id. 
 9. ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION & PRIVATE 
PROPERTY 69 (1932). 
 10. Manne, supra note 1, at 113. 
 11. Id. at 112. 
 12. Fred S. McChesney, Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 50 CASE W. 
RES. L. REV. 245, 249 (1999). 
 13. Daniel Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the 
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1, 5 (1978). 
 14. McChesney, supra note 12, at 246. 
 15. Roberta Romano, After the Revolution in Corporate Law, 55 J. LEGAL EDUC. 342, 343 
(2005). 
 16. Id.; see also William J. Carney, The Legacy of “The Market for Corporate Control” and 
the Origins of the Theory of the Firm, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 215 (1999). 
 17. Romano, supra note 15, at 344–45. 
 18. Id. at 346. 
 19. Id. at 347. 
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vent of the hostile takeover era.20 In 1984, John Coffee wrote, “[T]he 
claim that hostile takeovers generate a disciplinary force that constrains 
managerial behavior cannot seriously be disputed.”21 From the 1980s 
onward, the MCC was adopted by corporate law scholars examining how 
the legal system should respond to those developments and challenges.22 
Manne’s contribution continues to stimulate and influence new genera-
tions of scholars; Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control is cur-
rently ranked as the twenty-ninth most cited law review article of all 
time, and it remains the most cited corporate law article.23 
An acceptance of the value of the MCC has led many scholars to 
advocate managerial passivity in the face of premium tender offers. 
Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel, in their seminal 1981 article The 
Proper Role of a Target’s Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 
noted that “[t]he tender bidding process polices managers whether or not 
a tender offer occurs, and disciplines or replaces them if they stray too 
far from the service of the shareholders.”24 Describing this as “the most 
powerful check on agency costs,” they concluded that the prevailing le-
gal rules allowing the target’s management to engage in defensive tactics 
in response to a tender offer decreases shareholders’ welfare.25 Although 
the U.S. courts did not adopt such a restrictive approach, Romano sug-
gested that this literature constituted “one of many factors affecting 
courts’ perception of takeovers, and, in particular, the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s 1985 revision of the fiduciary standard applicable in the hostile 
takeover context.”26 Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control has 
also had a profound effect on public policy both in the United States and 
beyond. As discussed further below, it formed part of the rationale put 
forward in support of regulation promoting an unconstrained and active 
takeover market in the European Union at a national and supranational 
level. 
In an ever-changing legal and economic environment, it is incum-
bent on us to subject all such premises to scrutiny in order to consider 
their continued application. This Article considers the effect of the MCC 
on the management of Irish credit institutions in the run-up to the finan-
                                                 
 20. Id. at 347–48. 
 21. John C. Coffee, Jr., Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of 
the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1294 (1984). 
 22. Romano, supra note 15, at 343. 
 23. Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review Articles of All Time, 110 
MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1490 (2012). 
 24. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target’s Management in 
Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1169 (1981). 
 25. Id. at 1196. 
 26. Romano, supra note 15, at 349. 
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cial crisis. Part II sets the background by explaining how the MCC has 
become an integral part of takeover regulation in Europe. The weakness-
es in the efficient market hypothesis, which underlie the MCC and are 
summarized in Part III, appear not to have undermined the theory’s cred-
ibility in the minds of public policy makers in Europe. Part IV explains 
the background of the financial crisis in Ireland, and Part V considers the 
effect of the MCC on management of Irish credit institutions in the run-
up to this crisis. A number of reports on the causes of the crisis in Ireland 
have identified corporate governance failures and, in particular, poor risk 
management and inappropriate remuneration structures in the years lead-
ing up to the crisis. These findings are consistent with similar studies of 
the financial crisis commissioned in other jurisdictions across the world. 
A concern is that this mismanagement does not appear to have been re-
flected in reduced share prices as the MCC would have predicted. In fact, 
the opposite occurred—share prices in credit institutions soared. 27 This 
Article argues not only that the MCC did not have the anticipated disci-
plinary effect on management, but also that it may have had the opposite 
effect. It appears as if certain boards may have acted recklessly in order 
to maintain share prices to stave off takeover bids. 
II. DIRECTIVE 2004/25/EC ON TAKEOVER BIDS 
The impact of the MCC theory on European takeover policy may 
have been even more profound than its influence in the United States. 
This may be explained in part by the significant influence exerted on Eu-
ropean takeover regulation by the U.K. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
(U.K. Panel) through its City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
Code). Historically, the U.K. market for takeovers constituted over 50% 
of the whole E.U. market for corporate control,28 and the U.K. Panel, 
established in 1968, possesses unrivalled experience of takeovers and 
acknowledged expertise in the field of takeover regulation.29 In 1974, the 
European Commission (Commission) invited Professor Pennington, a 
U.K. company law expert, to produce a proposal for a draft directive on 
                                                 
 27. See RANU DAYAL ET AL., LIVING WITH NEW REALITIES: CREATING NEW VALUE IN 
BANKING 2009 (2009), available at http://www.bcg.com/documents/file15429.pdf. The share prices 
of financial institutions worldwide did not begin to decline until mid-2007 and the decline then 
became most dramatic in the third quarter of 2008. 
 28. MARCCUS PARTNERS, THE TAKEOVER BIDS DIRECTIVE ASSESSMENT REPORT 285 (2012), 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/study/study_en.pdf 
(noting that since the financial crisis, the number of takeovers in the United Kingdom has declined 
whilst the number in continental Europe has remained relatively stable). 
 29. See Andrew Johnston, Takeover Regulation: Historical and Theoretical Perspectives on 
the City Code, 66 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 422 (2007). 
2013] The Market for Corporate Control 581 
takeovers.30 Many of the proposal’s features are modeled on the Code. 
One of these is the board-neutrality rule, which is reflected in the Code’s 
general principle that shareholders should not be denied an opportunity 
to decide on the merits of a takeover,31 and the rule that boards of offeree 
companies are prohibited from defending a bid unless shareholder ap-
proval is granted.32 Although offeree company boards may mount a ro-
bust defense33 or seek a white knight,34 they are not permitted to unilater-
ally frustrate a bid.35 
The Commission published the first draft directive in 1989,36 but 
agreement on the substance and even the form of this legislation proved 
extremely difficult due to the significant differences between member 
states’ capital markets, corporate governance regimes, and political cul-
tures.37 Following intense negotiations at the European Council Working 
Group38 and at the Commission,39 the Commission in 2001 compiled and 
submitted a directive to the European Parliament.40 This proposal con-
tained a board-neutrality rule that would have restricted defensive actions 
performed by the board without the prior authorization from the share-
holders.41 The restriction would have applied at least from the time the 
board became aware of the decision to make an offer or, if member states 
                                                 
 30. See ROBERT R. PENNINGTON, REPORT ON TAKEOVERS AND OTHER BIDS (1974). 
 31. General Principle 3 states, “The Code is designed principally to ensure that shareholders in 
an offeree company are treated fairly and are not denied an opportunity to decide on the merits of a 
takeover and that shareholders in the offeree company of the same class are afforded equivalent 
treatment by an offeror.” PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS 
AND MERGERS, gen. princ. 3 (10th ed. 2011). 
 32. Id. r. 21. 
 33. The defense would be subject, of course, to compliance with the City Code including, for 
example, rule 19, which imposes a high standard of care and regulates documents, advertisements, 
interviews, debates, and other materials and interactions. 
 34. This is subject to rule 20.2, which ensures a degree of equality of information for compet-
ing offerors. 
 35. Simon Deakin & Ajit Singh, The Stock Market, the Market for Corporate Control and the 
Theory of the Firm: Legal and Economic Perspectives and Implications for Public Policy, in THE 
MODERN FIRM, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND INVESTMENTS 12–13 (Bjuggren, P. O. & Mueller, 
D. eds., 2008), available at http://www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP365.pdf (noting that related aspects of 
company and securities law in the United Kingdom, such as statutory preemption rights and the 
proper-purpose rule, also prevent certain potentially defensive behaviors by corporate boards). 
 36. Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and 
Other General Bids, 1989 O.J. (C 64) 8. 
 37. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament - Mod-
ernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the European Union - A Plan to 
Move Forward, para. 3.1, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003). 
 38. The European Council Working Groups function as preparatory bodies for the Council of 
Ministers and are comprised of national officials with expertise in the areas under discussion. 
 39. See 1996 O.J. (C 162) 5; see also 1997 O.J. (C 378) 10. 
 40. 2001 O.J. (C 23) 1. 
 41. Id. art. 9(1). 
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required, as soon as the board became aware that an offer was imminent. 
A tied vote ensued and the proposed directive was accordingly rejected 
with the proposed board-neutrality rule receiving particular criticism.42 
Parliamentarians appeared to be particularly concerned that this rule 
would create an uneven playing field between the European Union and 
the United States. The discrepancy would be on the basis of the broad 
discretion afforded to the boards of American companies to utilize defen-
sive devices pursuant to the business judgment rule, and also the stake-
holder statutes that apply in many individual states.43 
The Commission subsequently appointed a high-level group of 
company law experts to consider the matters raised by Parliament.44 This 
group opined that in the light of available economic evidence, the availa-
bility of a mechanism to facilitate takeover bids would be beneficial.45 It 
cited three reasons for this: the exploitation of synergies, the opportunity 
to sell at a premium on market price, and the market for corporate con-
trol.46 In relation to the latter point, the group noted that “actual and po-
tential takeover bids are an important means to discipline the manage-
ment of listed companies with dispersed ownership . . . . Such discipline 
of management . . . is in the long term in the best interests of all stake-
holders, and society at large.”47 Thus, the group concluded that “any re-
gime which confers discretion on a board to impede or facilitate a bid 
inevitably involves unacceptable cost and risk.”48 This acknowledgement 
marks a resounding acceptance of the MCC. In response to the concern 
that European companies would be detrimentally affected by the dispari-
ty of treatment of companies in the United States referred to above, the 
group determined that the American approach was less likely to benefit 
the development of efficient, integrated capital markets in Europe be-
cause the legal and capital market environment is significantly differ-
                                                 
 42. See JAAP WINTER ET AL., REPORT OF THE HIGH LEVEL GROUP OF COMPANY LAW EXPERTS 
ON ISSUES RELATED TO TAKEOVER BIDS (2002), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/ 
company/docs/takeoverbids/2002-01-hlg-report_en.pdf; see also Blanaid Clarke, The Takeovers 
Directive: Is a Little Regulation Better Than No Regulation? 15 EUR. L.J. 174 (2009) (noting Par-
liament also argued that the protection for employees of companies involved in the bid was insuffi-
cient). 
 43. WINTER, supra note 42, at 39–42. 
 44. Press Release, Company Law: Commission Creates High Level Group of Experts (Apr. 9, 
2001), available at http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1237&format= 
HTML&aged=1&language=en&guiLanguage=en. 
 45. WINTER, supra note 42, at 19. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 21. 
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ent.49 It specifically referred to the existence of greater pressure to en-
hance shareholder value on American boards from nonexecutive direc-
tors, investment banks and institutional investors, heightened media scru-
tiny, proxy contests, and a larger number of liability suits against direc-
tors because derivative actions are easier to bring and the judicial system 
is better equipped to handle these issues.50 The group also noted that anti-
takeover rules are controversial even within the United States, and that 
while some accept them as the outcome of regulatory competition among 
the states and effective lobbying by the business community, there is a 
large body of both economic and legal literature arguing that such rules 
should be prohibited.51 
In 2004, Directive 2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids (the Directive) 
was finally passed.52 Although the board-neutrality rule was left in the 
Directive, a compromise proposal by the Portuguese Presidency was in-
cluded, thereby rendering the provision optional for member states53 and 
also allowing member states to adopt a reciprocity rule.54 Nineteen of the 
twenty-seven member states adopted the board-neutrality rule, although 
its effect is somewhat diminished by the fact that five of these states opt-
ed to make reciprocity available.55 In its recent review of the Directive, 
the Commission reported that the board-neutrality rule has been a “rela-
tive success”56 in terms of its implementation, and the Commission is not 
proposing to make the rule mandatory.57 In coming to this conclusion, 
the Commission relied on an assessment report on the Directive indicat-
ing that stakeholders found that the optional board-neutrality rule had 
                                                 
 49. Id. at 40–42. The Group also noted that European companies have benefited from the in-
tensive takeover activity in the United States, and that a number of defensive tactics are introduced 
to protect shareholders from partial bids, which are not allowed in the Directive. 
 50. Id. at 41. 
 51. Id. at 42. 
 52. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC). 
 53. Id. art. 12.1. Member states may opt out of adopting the board-neutrality rule under article 
9, but in such a case article 12.2 provides that they must allow individual companies to voluntarily 
apply the rule. A similar compromise applies to the breakthrough rule applied in article 11 of the 
Directive. 
 54. Id. art. 12.3. Member states may exempt companies that choose to opt in to the board-
neutrality rule or the breakthrough rule to not apply the rule if they become the subject of a bid from 
an offeror who has not applied the same rule. 
 55. Paul L. Davies, Edmund-Philipp Schuster & Emilie Van de Walle de Ghelcke, The Takeo-
ver Directive as a Protectionist Tool? 14 (Eur. Corporate Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 
141/2010, 2010), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1554616. 
 56. Report from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Eco-
nomic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Application of Directive 
2004/25/EC on Takeover Bids, at 8, COM (2012) 347 final (June 28, 2012), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/takeoverbids/COM2012_347_en.pdf. 
 57. Id. at 10. 
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contributed to the openness of the European Union’s MCC,58 but that 
there was “little appetite to change.”59 The report endorsed the MCC the-
ory by accepting that “transfers of corporate control (takeovers) may re-
sult in a more efficient allocation of control if the offeror presents a 
higher valuation of control because it is capable of using the pool of as-
sets in the offeree company to generate greater value than the incum-
bent.”60 But the report concluded that the board-neutrality rule had only a 
moderate economic impact: although it may have increased the incen-
tives to make an offer by removing post-bid defenses, it may also have 
reduced the potential premium paid by the offeror and encouraged in-
cumbent shareholders to entrench before an offer is made.61 
III. THE EFFICIENT MARKET HYPOTHESIS 
In finance, capital market efficiency is the notion that all available 
information about a company is fully reflected in share price.62 The view 
generally put forward is that markets are “semi-strong” in the sense that 
prices adjust rapidly in response to fluctuations in public information.63 
In Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, Manne accepted that 
“a fundamental premise” underlying the market for corporate control is 
“the existence of a high positive correlation between corporate manage-
rial efficiency and the market price of shares of that company.”64 He not-
ed that there are “compelling reasons”65 for believing that this correlation 
exists. He explained in a footnote: 
Insiders, those who have the most reliable information about corpo-
rate affairs, are strongly motivated financially to perform a kind of 
arbitrage function for their company’s stock. That is, given their 
sense of what constitutes efficient management, they will cause 
share prices to rise or decline in accordance with that standard.66 
                                                 
 58. MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 28, at 209. 
 59. Id. at 355. 
 60. Id. at 320. 
 61. Id. at 357. 
 62. Eugene Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970). 
 63. Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakmann, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 644 (1984). 
 64. Manne, supra note 1, at 112. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. Manne used the term “insiders” to refer to persons presently controlling the affairs of 
the company. One way in which Manne suggested that insiders push share prices in the right direc-
tion is by insider dealing. See HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET 
(1966). He also acknowledged the role of explicit public disclosure of information, sanctioned com-
munication of information to financial analysts, and “derivative” trading, which occurs after some 
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Manne continued by explaining that dealings by shareholders, or poten-
tial shareholders, operating without reliable information will be “ran-
domly distributed,”67 yielding a neutral effect. On the other hand, dealing 
by insiders will move the average market price of a company’s shares to 
the “correct”68 one because they are not random. 
In 2003, Lynn Stout noted that it was not necessary to have waited 
several decades to develop the suspicion that “efficient market theory 
fails, in some fundamental respect, to capture the reality of securities 
markets.”69 Nor, she states, “need we have suffered through the [c]rash 
of 1987 and the 1990s tech stock bubble to find enlightenment.”70 Stout 
argues that the weaknesses of the efficient market theory were apparent 
to anyone who cared to look for them. Within a few years after the theo-
ry was first developed and disseminated, “the trickle of legal articles 
questioning the market’s efficiency had become a flood.”71 
In the aftermath of the banking crisis in the United Kingdom, the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer asked Lord Turner, the Financial Services 
Authority Chairman, to review and make recommendations for reform-
ing U.K. and international approaches to banking regulations.72 The re-
sulting report published in March 2009 stated that the assumptions un-
derlying the efficient market theory have been subject to increasingly 
effective criticism, “drawing on both theoretical and empirical argu-
ments.”73 Behavioral economic theories suggest that the markets are vul-
nerable to socio-psychological factors such as herding, noise, and bub-
bles.74 As noted by Lord Turner, “[m]any market participants accept on 
the basis of pragmatic observation that significant temporary bubbles in 
market prices are possible.”75 Lord Turner concluded that there is also 
evidence of pervasive and systemic biases in the marketplace,76 and that 
                                                                                                             
form of “market signalling.” See Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading: Hayek, Virtual Markets, and the 
Dog That Did Not Bark, 31 J. CORP. L. 167 (2005). 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 637 (2003). 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 667; see also Nicholas Wolfson, Efficient Markets, Hubris, Chaos, Legal Scholarship 
and Takeovers, 63 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 511 (1989); Lynn A. Stout, On the Nature of Corporations, U. 
ILL. L. REV. 253 (2005). 
 72. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., THE TURNER REVIEW: A REGULATORY RESPONSE TO THE GLOBAL 
BANKING CRISIS (2009), available at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/turner_review.pdf. 
 73. Id. at 40. 
 74. See ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (2d ed. 2005); Donald C. Langevoort, 
The Behavioral Economics of Mergers and Acquisitions, 12 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 65 
(2011). 
 75. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 72, at 40. 
 76. See, e.g., DANIEL KAHNEMAN, PAUL SLOVIC & AMOS TVERSKY, JUDGMENT UNDER 
UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES (1982); Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529 (1986); Ronald 
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policymakers have to recognize that “all liquid traded markets are capa-
ble of acting irrationally, and can be susceptible to self-reinforcing herd 
and momentum effects.”77 
A further weakness is evidenced by the inability of the efficient 
market hypothesis to accommodate derivatives trading. The hypothesis 
depends on an even flow of information through to the market, and expe-
rience has demonstrated that derivative trading can lead to information 
asymmetries and ultimately price inefficiencies in the marketplace. An 
example of such an asymmetry exists between informed contracts for 
difference holders and uninformed investors.78 Manne’s explanation of 
the MCC expressly assumes that insiders always have complete 
knowledge, whereas the advent of derivatives trading has changed that. 
Henry Hu recently argued that the twenty-first century financial system 
is simply becoming “too complex to depict.”79 
IV. THE IRISH BANKING EXPERIENCE 
Ireland experienced one of the most catastrophic financial crises in 
the developed world.80 In 2012, the cost to the taxpayers of bank recapi-
talization was estimated at approximately €64.1 billion ($80.4 billion)81 
with expectations that this figure may continue to rise. In addition, write-
downs of shareholder funds in the banks covered by the government 
guarantee82 and write-downs of shareholder funds at the foreign banks 
operating in Ireland were estimated at €29 billion ($36.4 billion) and €28 
billion ($35.1 billion), respectively.83 Liability-management exercises 
amounted to an additional €14 billion. To put those figures in context, 
                                                                                                             
Gilson & Reinier Kraakmann, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency Twenty Years Later: The Hind-
sight Bias, 28 J. CORP. L. 715 (2003); Andrei Shleifer & Lawrence Summers, The Noise Trader 
Approach to Finance, 4 J. ECON. PERSP. 19 (1990). 
 77. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., supra note 72, at 41. 
 78. For example, the holder of a long contract for difference position will be aware, based on 
market practice, that when the contract is closed out, there is likely to be ready access to the underly-
ing securities. FIN. SERVS. AUTH., DISCLOSURE OF CONTRACTS FOR DIFFERENCE: FEEDBACK ON 
CP08/17 AND FINAL RULES 7 (2009). 
 79. See Henry Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information” and the SEC 
Disclosure Paradigm, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1601 (2012). 
 80. See Blanaid Clarke & Niamh Hardiman, Crisis in the Irish Banking System (UCD Geary 
Inst. Discussion Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2012/03, 2012), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2008302. 
 81. 772 DÁIL DEB. no. 1, at 86 (July 17, 2012), available at http://debates.oireachtas.ie/dail/ 
2012/07/17/00086.asp. 
 82. See CREDIT INSTITUTIONS (ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES GUARANTEE) SCHEME 2009: DRAFT 
SCHEME FOR THE GUARANTEE BY THE MINISTER FOR FINANCE OF ELIGIBLE LIABILITIES SUBJECT TO 
THE APPROVAL OF THE OIREACHTAS (2009), http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/ 
statutoryinstruments/2009/guaranttdraftsch09.pdf. 
 83. See Clarke & Hardiman, supra note 80. 
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Ireland’s total gross domestic product in 2011 was €159 billion.84 Nearly 
half of these losses are attributable to a single bank, Anglo Irish Bank,85 
with most of the remaining losses being incurred by Ireland’s two oldest 
banks: the Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank.86 All three banks, to-
gether with Irish Life and Permanent, a former building society, were 
listed on the Irish and London Stock Exchanges. This means that theoret-
ically they had broad shareholder bases and were thus exposed to the 
MCC. 
In an effort to understand the causes of Ireland’s banking crisis, 
three reports have been produced at the bequest of the Irish government. 
The first report was prepared by the Governor of the Central Bank, Pat-
rick Honohan.87 The second report was prepared by Klaus Regling, a 
German economist and current Chief Executive Officer of the European 
Financial Stability Facility, together with Max Watson, previously a 
senior adviser on economic and financial affairs at the European 
Commission and Deputy Director in the IMF.88 The final report was 
prepared by Peter Nyberg, a Finnish economist and previous Director 
General of the Financial Markets Department in the Finnish Ministry of 
Finance.89 While all three reports concluded that Ireland’s crisis bears the 
clear imprint of global influences, the crisis was in crucial ways “home-
made.”90 Unlike the United States or Britain, Ireland’s enormous banking 
exposure did not stem from a proliferation of complex financial products 
or exposure to the United States subprime mortgage market. Instead, Ire-
land’s banking crisis was described by Regling and Watson as 
“a plain vanilla property bubble, compounded by exceptional concentra-
tions of lending for purposes related to property and notably commercial 
property.”91 So, while international pressures did contribute to the tim-
ing, intensity, and depth of the Irish banking crisis, the essential charac-
teristic of the problem was domestic and classic.92 
                                                 
 84. CENT. STATISTICS OFFICE, MEASURING IRELAND’S PROGRESS 17 (2012). 
 85. Anglo Irish Bank (along with the Irish Nationwide Building Society) is now re-titled Irish 
Bank Resolution Corporation Limited. 
 86. 772 DÁIL DEB., no. 1, at 86. 
 87. See PATRICK HONOHAN ET AL., THE IRISH BANKING CRISIS: REGULATORY AND FINANCIAL 
STABILITY POLICY (2010), available at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24896/1/MPRA_paper 
_24896.pdf. 
 88. See KLAUS REGLING & MAX WATSON, A PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE SOURCES OF 
IRELAND’S BANKING CRISIS (2010), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/Preliminary 
%20Report%20into%20Ireland’s%20Banking%20Crisis%2031%20May%202010.pdf. 
 89. See PETER NYBERG, COMMISSION OF INVESTIGATION INTO THE BANKING SECTOR IN 
IRELAND (2011), available at http://www.bankinginquiry.gov.ie/. 
 90. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 5; see also HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 134; 
NYBERG, supra note 89, at 96–99. 
 91. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 6. 
 92. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 22. 
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A number of macroeconomic conditions played a role in triggering 
Ireland’s banking crisis. Ireland’s use of the euro brought access to cheap 
finance both for the banks and for their customers.93 Demand for credit 
was particularly high amongst builders and property developers.94 Com-
petition between the Irish lending institutions, including the nondomestic 
banks, intensified. As they desperately sought to hold their share of the 
rapidly expanding market, new lending instruments such as tracker mort-
gages and 100% loans were offered, and the loan approval processes be-
came more streamlined.95 Anglo Irish Bank, for example, was proud of 
its reputation as “a relationship lender” and went to great lengths to ac-
commodate its top clients.96 Nyberg characterized the environment as 
one in which the supply of credit available exceeded demand for good-
quality loans.97 The three-fold increase in average real-property prices 
from 1994 to 2006 was described by Honohan as “the highest in any ad-
vanced economy in recent times,”98 and one which, “long before it 
peaked, looked unsustainable to most commentators.”99 
As Anglo’s profits increased, and as it was rewarded by staggering 
growths in its share price, the larger and traditionally more conservative 
banks—Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish Bank—came under increasing 
pressure to relax their own loan-approval and risk-assessment practic-
es in order to keep pace.100 
A further contributing factor to the Irish crisis was the existence of 
significant corporate governance failures. Because of the small market-
place, significant groupthink and lack of diversity on the boards appear 
to have exacerbated the problem.101 Regling and Watson identified four 
key areas in which poor bank management and governance contributed 
to the Irish banking crisis. First, management failed to appreciate the risk 
entailed by the significant concentration of bank assets in activities relat-
ed to property, and especially non-household-based commercial proper-
ty. Property-related lending grew by 29.4% and speculative commercial 
and property lending grew by an average of 56.5% each year between 
                                                 
 93. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 12. 
 94. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 20. 
 95. Id. at 21. “Tracker mortgages” are mortgages whose rates vary in accordance with the 
European Central Bank base interest rate. 
 96. Id. at 32. This was driven not merely by a desire to demonstrate loyalty to old customers 
but also by the fear that such customers would find the finance from their banking competitors. 
 97. Id. 
 98. HONOHAN ET AL., supra note 87, at 24. 
 99. Id.; see also Patrick Honohan, Resolving Ireland’s Banking Crisis, 40 ECON. & SOC. REV. 
207 (2009). 
 100. NYBERG, supra note 89, at 34–35. 
 101. Id. at 86. 
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2002 and 2007.102 Domestic-property lending represented 80% of all 
growth in credit.103 Second, lending guidelines and processes appear to 
have been widely circumvented.104 Third, poor remunera-
tion policies that encouraged and rewarded risk-taking were tolerated. 
For instance, in 2007, the Chief Executive of Anglo Irish Bank, David 
Drumm, received total remuneration for the year of €3.3 million includ-
ing a €2 million bonus.105 Drumm’s Bank of Ireland and Allied Irish 
Bank counterparts received €2.97 million and €2.1 million, respective-
ly.106 The Anglo Irish Bank Chairman, Sean Fitzpatrick, received fees of 
€431,000 that year, and the total package for the fourteen members of the 
board was €9.63 million.107 The fourth failure involved “very specific 
and serious breaches of basic governance principles”108 concerning iden-
tifiable transactions in specific institutions including undisclosed loans to 
directors, creative accounting, and loans to investors to purchase 
bank shares.109 In considering the reaction of the market to these four 
failings, it is important to note that only the last one would not have been 
outwardly evident to the public. 
V. THE OPERATION OF THE MCC IN THE IRISH BANKING SECTOR 
Before examining the market’s reactions to the aforementioned 
corporate governance failings, it is necessary to consider the nature of the 
market for corporate control in Ireland. Share ownership in Ireland is 
relatively widely dispersed, and the level of takeover activity is reasona-
bly high.110 As the table below demonstrates, since 1997, there has been 
an average of 5.3 takeovers per year from an annual average of seventy-
five relevant companies. In that time, there have been only seven hostile 
takeover offers (an average of 0.5 per year), and none of these takeovers 
have been successful. In four of the bids, a preferred bidder ultimately 
acquired the targets, and in the remaining three bids, control did not pass 
and the targets remained independent. In two of the latter instances, 
competition issues may have caused a significant barrier to the acquisi-
tion. 
                                                 
 102. Id. at 17. 
 103. Id. at 14. 
 104. See id. at 96–97; REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 35. 
 105. ANGLO IRISH BANK, ANNUAL REPORTS & ACCOUNTS 126 (2007), available at 
http://www.ibrc.ie/About_us/Financial_information/Archived_reports/Annual_Report_2007.pdf. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. REGLING & WATSON, supra note 88, at 35. 
 109. Id. at 35, 36. 
 110. MARCCUS PARTNERS, supra note 28, at 284 (noting a significant decrease in takeovers in 
Europe in the aftermath of the financial crisis, with the average value of deals in 2010 reduced to the 
level in 2003 and an even greater decrease in the number of deals). 
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Figure 1: Level of Takeover Activity in Ireland111 













subjected to a 
Bid 
1998 5 0 78 6.4% 
1999 7 (6) 1 80 7.5% 
2000 8 (7) 1 77 9.1% 
2001 8 0 79 10.1% 
2002 7 (6) 1 76 7.9% 
2003 9 0 67 13.4% 
2004 4 (3) 0 64 4.7% 
2005 2 0 66 3.0% 
2006 3 0 82 3.6% 
2007 8 1 83 9.6% 
2008 9 0 81 11.1% 
2009 1 1 79 1.2% 
2010 8(7) 2 75 9.3% 
2011 4 (3) 0 70 4.3% 
 
The Irish Takeover Panel is the supervisory authority responsible 
for monitoring takeovers of relevant Irish companies. It took over this 
role from the London Panel, which monitored Irish companies until 
1997.112 The Takeover Rules of the 1997 Irish Takeover Panel Act, 
though in statutory form, are derived from the City Code and are very 
similar in substance. Rule 21 of the Irish Takeover Rules sets out a 
board-neutrality rule that, like its U.K. counterpart, requires shareholder 
approval for actions that might frustrate a takeover or deprive sharehold-
ers of the opportunity to consider a bid.113 When implementing the Take-
                                                 
 111. The data in figure 1 was compiled from the Irish Takeover Panel’s annual reports from 
1997 to 2011, which are available at http://www.irishtakeoverpanel.ie/about/annual-reports/. “Rele-
vant companies” primarily include Irish registered companies listed on the Irish Stock Exchange, the 
London Stock Exchange, the New York Stock Exchange, and Nasdaq. See Irish Takeover Panel Act 
1997 § 2 (Act No. 5/1997) (as amended by § 75 of the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscella-
neous Provisions Act in 2005 and § 26 of the Investment Funds, Companies and Miscellaneous 
Provisions Act in 2006), available at http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/pdf/1997/en.act.1997.0005.pdf. 
The term “takeover” is defined in the 1997 Irish Takeover Panel Act and includes schemes of ar-
rangement. 
 112. Blanaid Clarke, The Irish Takeover Panel Act, 1997: A Further Cutting of the UK Regula-
tory Ties, in 1 PALMER’S COMPANY LAW 1 (Geoffrey Morse ed., 1998). 
 113. Takeover Rules 2007 r. 21, Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997. 
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overs Directive in 2006,114 Ireland also maintained its position on neu-
trality and did not adopt the reciprocity rule. Thus, it can be said that Ire-
land, too, seeks to ensure an unconstrained takeover market. The Irish 
Panel, as required by the Directive, also applies a mandatory-bid rule.115 
This means that an acquisition of securities that leads to the acquirer, 
together with any concert party, holding 30% or more of securities con-
ferring voting rights in the company triggers an obligation to make a bid 
for the entire share capital.116 
Control structures and barriers to takeovers, such as pyramid struc-
tures and cross-shareholdings, are uncommon in Ireland and not covered 
by the Directive. National competition law would have been a factor in 
deterring the main Irish credit institutions from launching takeover bids 
for each other. E.U. merger controls could have been seen as a barrier to 
acquisitions from related institutions. Sectorial regulation may also have 
been a consideration, as prior notification to, and approval of, the Central 
Bank, and in certain cases the Minister for Finance, is required for pro-
posals to acquire specific holdings in Irish banks.117 A holding of 10% of 
the total shares or of the total voting rights attaching to shares would typ-
ically fall within the scope of this requirement,118 although the Central 
Bank may exempt such a transaction if it is entered into with the Central 
Bank’s prior approval “in the interests of the proper and orderly regula-
tion of banking or financial markets in the State.”119 It is submitted that 
despite these regulatory restrictions, the Irish banks would still have been 
subject to the MCC. 
Applying the MCC to the Irish credit-institution market suggests 
that the share prices of the listed institutions should have dropped to re-
flect their increasingly poor risk management and corporate governance, 
and consequently the institutions should have been acquired and im-
proved. Yet, as figure 2 below demonstrates, this did not happen. Profits 
in the four banks, and Anglo Irish Bank in particular, grew significantly. 
Demand for shares grew, and from January 2000 to its peak in February 
2007, the combined market capitalization of the four banks rose from 
€20.4 billion to €57.4 billion. In this period, Anglo’s market capitaliza-
tion grew over 2,000% from €0.6 billion in early 2000 to a peak of €13.3 
billion in mid-2007. 
                                                 
 114. Council Directive 2004/25, 2004 O.J. (L 142) 12 (EC). 
 115. Id. art. 5. 
 116. Irish Takeover Panel Act 1997 r. 9. 
 117. See The Central Bank Act 1989 (Act No. 16/1989) (Ir.), available at http://www.irish 
statutebook.ie/1989/en/act/pub/0016/index.html. 
 118. Id. § 74. 
 119. Id. § 75(2). 
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Figure 2: Individual Market Capitalizations of Listed Covered Banks 
2000–January 2009120 
 
It seems clear from a study of these prices that shareholders did not 
desert the Irish banks in droves as Manne predicted. Instead, they in-
creased their level of investment, thereby driving share prices upward. It 
was only when “the music”121 stopped in mid-2007 that interbank 
lending slowed down and share prices began to decline due to market 
fears of overexposure to potential losses on high-risk U.S. mortgages. 
Then the Northern Bank run in September 2007,122 its nationalization in 
February 2008,123 followed by the failure of Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac in July 2008,124 led market analysts and credit-rating agencies to 
express concern about the stability of the banks.125 Lehman Brothers 
collapsed in September 2008,126 and the share prices of credit institutions 
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 122. Press Release, Bank of Eng., Liquidity Support Facility for Northern Rock Plc (Sept. 14, 
2007), available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/news/2007/090.htm. 
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(last visited Oct. 15, 2012). 
 124. See Press Release, Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Fact Sheet: Questions and Answers on Con-
servatorship (Sept. 7, 2008), available at http://www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/ 
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across the world tumbled.127 The markets determined that Anglo Irish 
Bank was particularly exposed.128 A March 2008 report by analyst Philip 
Ingram of Merrill Lynch identified Anglo Irish Bank as the bank with the 
greatest credit risk to the bursting U.K. commercial-property market.129 
Days later, the Lex column in the Financial Times suggested that “no-
body wants to have anything to do with banks with commercial property 
exposure (Anglo Irish Bank and HBOS).”130 At this stage, investors 
started to sell their shares in significant numbers.131 
Interestingly, the management of many of the institutions, the so-
called “insiders,” did not appear to engage in conduct to push the share 
prices toward the “correct” price as Manne had predicted. In fact, the 
signals suggested that the market price represented good value for poten-
tial investors as many directors invested heavily in their own firms. For 
example, between September 2007 and September 2008, David Drumm 
increased his shareholding in Anglo Irish Bank from 510,899 to 
1,013,556 shares. Sean Fitzpatrick increased his holding from 4,512,712 
to 4,909,429 shares during the same period.132 In the twelve months lead-
ing up to September 2007, David Drumm had increased his holding by 
205,379 shares and Sean Fitzpatrick by 38,843 shares.133 
The level of takeovers in Europe experienced an upward trend from 
2003 to 2007 both in terms of value and number.134 But it has been a 
long-acknowledged fact that the discipline of the capital market is only 
effective within a limited range.135 John Coffee, commenting on the 
MCC, pointed out that the level of risk required to accept a financially 
distressed company is high. Poorly managed companies may be per-
ceived as carrying excessive risk and may thus become indigestible.136 In 
other words, these businesses are immune from attack precisely because 
of their pervasive inefficiency.137 This was of course true in the aftermath 
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of the crisis.138 But until 2007–2008, there did not seem to be a public 
perception that the Irish banks were badly managed. For example, in 
January 2007, the international management-consultancy firm Oliver 
Wyman named Anglo Irish Bank “the world’s best bank” in the year of 
2006.139 
A further complication for Anglo Irish Bank arose in the form of a 
significant undisclosed contract for differences (CFD) holding in the 
company. The Anglo “insiders” described themselves as “physically 
shocked” when they finally discovered in September 2007 that one of 
their lending clients, Sean Quinn, had invested in CFDs relating to at 
least 25% of Anglo’s share capital.140 At the time, neither Irish nor E.U. 
law required public disclosure of these holdings, and the company was in 
no better position than the market to identify this “hidden” owner or de-
termine the scale of his holding. 
In addition to the failure of the MCC to lead to inefficient compa-
nies being taken over, it is argued that the MCC failed in another way. 
One of the three government-commissioned reports on the banking crisis, 
the Nyberg Report, was given the express mandate to examine why a 
number of public and private institutions had acted in an imprudent or 
ineffective manner during the period spanning January 1, 2003, to Janu-
ary 15, 2009.141 After discussing the intense market-share competition 
between domestic and foreign banks and the growth in lending, especial-
ly to the property market, Nyberg noted, 
It was against this backdrop that the covered banks pursued strate-
gies which would lead to higher growth, higher reported profits and 
higher bank valuations. A primary reason appears to have been to 
prevent a predatory takeover by another bank (either domestic or 
foreign) and thus maintain independence.142 
. . . 
The strategies of the two bigger banks [Allied Irish Bank and Bank 
of Ireland] included a desire to maintain their independence. To 
drive share price growth, and thereby increase their market capitali-
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sations, it was felt that banks needed to show sufficiently strong 
growth in earnings and at least maintain market share. Strong mar-
ket capitalisations, in turn, somewhat protected the banks from 
takeover by a domestic or foreign competitor . . . . Accordingly, 
during the Period, strategies in both bigger banks evolved to allow 
increased exposure to the commercial property market as this was a 
sector that could provide for the significant loan growth required to 
meet earnings targets.143 
This finding is particularly troublesome in that it suggests that the MCC, 
rather than acting as a disciplinary force, acted as a destabilizing force on 
the management of potentially vulnerable companies. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Lord Turner’s findings regarding the disciplinary effect of the mar-
kets were generally equally negative. He opined: 
But a strong case can be made that the events of the last five years 
have illustrated the inadequacy of market discipline: indeed, they 
suggest that in some ways market prices and market pressures may 
have played positively harmful roles. . . . Bank share prices similar-
ly failed to indicate that risks were increasing, but rather delivered 
strong market price reinforcement to management’s convictions that 
their aggressive growth strategies were value creative.144 
This is consistent with research that has demonstrated the existence of 
regulatory paradoxes where regulation “not only fails to change behav-
iour, manage risks or achieve any other stated goals, but actually produc-
es the opposite effects from those intended.”145 If, as is argued here, a 
case can be made that the MCC has negative, or at best neutral, effects 
on the behavior of corporate boards, further thought needs to be given to 
the potential effect such a determination has on financial regulation, cor-
porate governance, and takeover regulation. A number of possible sce-
narios may be considered. 
If corporate management acts inefficiently, but the market fails to 
recognize this fact, the management will not be concerned with a hostile 
bid because the share price will remain high. The MCC will simply not 
operate, and regulators seeking to curb agency costs will need to look to 
other forms of regulation. It is noticeable that credit institutions have be-
come the subject of an increased number of mandatory corporate govern-
ance rules. In Ireland, for example, the Central Bank has introduced a 
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596 Seattle University Law Review [Vol. 36:577 
corporate governance code with statutory effect for credit institutions and 
insurance undertakings.146 At the E.U. level, new requirements govern 
the remuneration of certain personnel of credit institutions and invest-
ment firms.147 
Kurt Vonnegut famously observed that “a sane person to an insane 
society must appear insane.”148 In this context, if management acts effi-
ciently (namely, good corporate governance prevails and sound risk-
management systems are applied) but this trait is not valued by the mar-
ket, the management may correctly be concerned about a takeover from a 
less scrupulous bidder. Such a bidder may acquire the company and seek 
to engage in profitable, though not necessarily sustainable, behavior. The 
perverse effects of the MCC may apply. At present, the Directive, the 
City Code, and the Irish Takeover Rules allow the target board to mount 
a robust defense to any action. As such, one might consider that if a 
board refused to engage in short-term behavior and became the subject of 
a hostile offer, the board could explain that it was concerned with pre-
serving the long-term value of the company. While this might have some 
effect in a securities-exchange offer, it would arguably be significantly 
less persuasive in a cash bid. The company’s success in retaining its in-
dependence would then depend on persuading shareholders not to accept 
what may be a sizable premium offer over market price. This may not be 
easy. Shareholders may not be interested in arguments based on the 
benefits to the company moving forward. 
By way of example, one might consider the hostile takeover of 
Cadbury PLC by Kraft Foods, Inc. in 2010.149 Vince Cable, the current 
U.K. Business Secretary, complained that the decision to sell was made 
by institutional shareholders whom he referred to as “short term investors 
and financial gamblers [who] value a quick buck above all else.”150 By 
the time the offer was finally recommended by the board, hedge funds 
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and other short-term investors owned almost 31% of the company’s 
shares, up from just 5% before the offer was made. 151 Sir Roger Carr, the 
Cadbury Chairman, commented that once it became clear that the com-
pany would not remain independent, his task was to achieve the highest 
selling price for shareholders.152 This position was not altered by § 172 
of the U.K. Companies Act 2006,153 which ostensibly promotes corporate 
social responsibility by obliging directors to be aware of the likely con-
sequences of any decision in the long term, the interests of the compa-
ny’s employees, and the impact of the company’s operations on the 
community and the environment.154 In June 2011, an independent review 
was established under the chairmanship of Professor John Kay to consid-
er whether U.K. equity markets provided sufficient support for British 
industry’s capacity for innovation, its brands and reputations, and the 
skills of its workforce. In an interim review, Kay noted that in its survey 
of market participants, “there was wide agreement that the ability to 
mount a successful takeover now depends almost solely on the capacity 
and inclination to offer sufficient premium to the likely share price in the 
absence of the bid.”155 
The final report (Kay Report) similarly referred to the role of short-
term arbitrageurs whose sole purpose is to gamble on the bid being ac-
cepted, and noted: 
If there is a problem, it is that the underlying holders of shares are 
unwilling to reject an immediate offer at a premium to the previous 
share price even if they believe that the still higher fundamental 
value of the share will be revealed in the long-run. Or that they have 
no idea of the fundamental value of the share, but take the money 
and run.156 
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The Government responded positively to the Kay Report and accepted its 
recommendation that “the scale and effectiveness of merger activity of 
and by UK companies should be kept under careful review” by the De-
partment for Business Innovation and Skills and by companies them-
selves.157 It also endorsed the call in the Kay Report’s “Good Practice 
Statement for Company Directors” to “acknowledge that long-term value 
creation in the interests of shareholders is best served by strategies which 
focus on investing appropriately to deliver sustainable performance ra-
ther than treating the business as a portfolio of financial interests.”158 
Klaus Hopt has described the MMC for banks as “especially 
weak” noting that it “cannot be trusted to be a major disciplining force in 
bank corporate governance.”159 While the Irish banking crisis has 
demonstrated weaknesses in the MCC, it must be acknowledged that the 
overvaluation of credit institutions by the markets prior to the crisis does 
not justify discounting the theory completely. Demsetz’s nirvana falla-
cy160 warns against such a step. Similarly, Kuhn, the influential philoso-
pher, has cautioned against imprudent abandonment of a theory simply 
because an anomaly is present in its supporting data.161 Though one 
might argue that the crisis has shown other forms of corporate govern-
ance and regulation to be imperfect, the MCC might still be considered 
an important weapon in the agency-problem armory. We have accepted 
other limitations to the theory in the past, and this may just be another 
one to factor into our thinking. 
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